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The Trouble with Carbon Pricing

It has a face that only economists can love?

We economists have long been enamored with carbon pricing. The concept is simple and sensible. If the economic damages from greenhouse gas emissions can be reflected in market prices, powerful market forces will work for, versus against, the planet.

Over the past two decades, a growing number of economists have been working to refine and elaborate on this elegant idea. This chart shows the growing number of papers published on the topic:

graph

Google scholar counts economics papers published on carbon pricing. Numbers were on the rise through 2012. Publications (and enthusiasm) have waned slightly in recent years.

It’s been easy to get economists excited about carbon pricing. But political constraints and widespread public misgivings have greatly complicated the translation from economic journals to real-world policy. Here in the U.S., there have been many failed attempts. And some of the hard-won successes have not endured.

Given this checkered past, and in the light of the new green idealism, many are questioning whether carbon pricing has any place in domestic carbon policy. I think carbon pricing has an essential role to play. But as we economist-types work to define and advocate for this role, we have to accept (versus ignore or wishfully assume away) some inconvenient truths.

Public opinion is shifting…but not fast enough

My former Michigan colleague Barry Rabe and his team have been tracking U.S. public opinion on climate policy since 2008. There’s a lot to unpack in these survey responses. I’ll highlight two key findings here.

First, carbon pricing consistently finishes last in the most popular climate policy competition. The figure below tracks public support for carbon pricing since 2009. The good news is that, in recent years, supporters are edging out opponents. But the not so good news is that a majority of opponents “strongly oppose” (orange bars) whereas the majority of proponents just “somewhat support” (light blue).

RABE1Source: National Survey on Energy and the Environment

The contrast between carbon tax support (above) and support for clean energy requirements (below) is striking. Public support for renewable energy mandates has been strong (deep blue bars) and unwavering. In the most recent 2018 survey (not pictured), a majority (54%) strongly support renewable energy mandates while only 12% strongly oppose. In that same survey, corresponding carbon tax responses are 22% and 30%, respectively.

RABE2

These voter-on-the-street policy preferences run counter to an economist’s sensibilities. With clean energy mandates, important low-cost abatement potential (such as fuel switching) goes untapped because mandates push clean technology versus penalizing the damages caused by fossil fuels. In other words, reliance on mandates (versus a carbon price) means the (short run) cost of achieving a given level of emissions abatement can be much higher than it needs to be. 

Of course, the reality is that asking voters to pay higher energy prices in exchange for some ill-defined promise of future climate benefits is a tough sell. A political advantage of mandates is that they focus on the shiny goal versus the painful process that will get us there.

A second important takeaway is that framing (and revenue allocation) matters. If you ask people whether they support an increase in their energy bills, it’s not surprising that a majority of Americans recoil. But when the tax is tied to more salient benefits (e.g., renewable energy investments), survey responses start to inch closer to the popularity of renewable energy mandates. This is particularly true in recent years:

What if the revenue from the carbon tax was reinvested in renewable energy projects like solar or wind energy? Would you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose such a system?

chart1

Source: National Surveys on Energy and the Environment

Americans are willing to pay if focused on benefits versus costs

Survey responses are revealing. But even the most carefully worded survey question about a hypothetical can generate misleading indicators of what people will actually do when it comes time to vote a climate change policy up or down. So it’s worth looking at revealed policy preferences. What are the policies that Americans, or at least their political representatives, have actually been supporting. And at what cost?

The graph below charts the rocky track record of carbon pricing relative to the steady progress of renewable energy mandates in the United States. No state has managed to adopt a carbon tax. But in the mid-2000’s, we saw some exciting green shoots of carbon pricing via cap-and-trade. By 2011, however, more than half the states that had formally signed on to regional initiatives had backed out. In contrast, support for renewable energy mandates endures.  

chart2

Source: Carbon pricing data taken from Barry Rabe’s excellent book “Can We Price Carbon?” Data on state-level RPS adoption taken from the National Conference of State Legislators.

The carbon prices over this time period were in the range of $2-$3/ton (RGGI) and $12-$15/ton (California). The renewable energy mandates operating over this period were much more expensive. In a backward-looking analysis, we analyzed renewable energy credit (REC) prices paid in 2010-2012, the time when carbon pricing participation was flagging but RPS support was growing. For solar PV investments, REC prices effectively conferred subsidies in the range of $100-$480 per ton of carbon abated. These high – but hidden –  costs were being incurred in the same states that were dropping out of – or electing not to participate in – relatively inexpensive carbon pricing programs.

It’s worth noting that these cost comparisons focus on short-run marginal abatement costs and benefits.  If we think that renewable energy portfolio standards can more effectively accelerate the large scale innovation and technological change that will be required to combat climate change, then these relative dynamic efficiency advantages would offset some of the additional costs. 

Let’s make a green deal

No matter what you think about the Green New Deal, everyone’s talking about it. It points in a radical new direction with few details on how to get there. Discuss!

The GND is intentionally silent on the role of carbon pricing. But if it succeeds in re-energizing the discussion about federal climate change policy (I hope it does) a more pragmatic discussion of the all-important details will ensue.  There’s no blueprint for success. But one lesson I think we’ve learned is that a public-facing focus on pricing carbon does not sell well in the mass market. And framing matters. If we lead with the rallying cry of “tax carbon!”, it’s hard to imagine that the politically durable carbon price we could negotiate would be set at a level that is close to commensurate with the climate change threat.

In contrast, Americans in states red and blue have demonstrated a willingness to pay more for green energy if they are focused on goal-setting defined in terms of tangible benefits. Mandates and prescriptive standards are not the most economically efficient solution. But their relative popularity makes them a durable second-best option.

If the public face of domestic climate policy must focus on popular and prescriptive mandates, there are ways to harness market forces in order to lower the costs of delivering on these goals and aspirations. Moreover, if a fraction of the ambition of the GND is retained in future domestic climate policy, we’ll need a way to pay for it. It may pain economists to see carbon pricing cast in a diminished backseat role. But given the political realities, we should work within the constraints these realities impose. And focus more of our energies on designing the best-possible second best.

Keep up with Energy Institute blogs, research, and events on Twitter @energyathaas.

Suggested citation: Fowlie, Meredith. “The Trouble with Carbon Pricing.” Energy Institute Blog, UC Berkeley, April 29, 2019, https://energyathaas.wordpress.com/2019/04/29/the-trouble-with-carbon-pricing/

47 thoughts on “The Trouble with Carbon Pricing Leave a comment

  1. Could you run a series on why pricing carbon, and then using the market, is important?

    Would California and elsewhere have made different decisions for electricity? Transportation? Industrial energy? Land use? How does that compare to current/popular alternatives? What else is happening with the market that makes solution sets with this tool more comprehensive than those without?

  2. European nations are the leaders in global climate performance and policy, whereas the U.S. is near the bottom of advanced nations in proportion of renewable to total energy used. Enthusiasts like to point to renewable in electrical power which has made progress (17%). But in terms of total energy it’s closer to 10%. Consider Sweden which has exceeded its goal of over 50% renewables in total energy use and plans to reach 100%.

    The issues mentioned in this excellent blog explain a significant part of the problem. Europeans can implement policies even when they entail costs because they are more carefully designed. In advanced European nations when the party in power wants new legislation it outlines goals and apolitical ministry task forces work out detail, including contacts with various sectors. This is a logical procedure so that major opposition or unforeseen pitfalls are avoided. A large segment of the U.S. public rejects anything that increases costs or imposes disadvantages. That’s not entirely irrational because the public lacks confidence in governmental claims, predictions or statements.

    Our system is grossly irrational in contrast. Any Congressman can propose hare-brained laws and some three quarters or more of bills serve to demonstrate productivity, not to get something done. Even those that get through committee are only scored for cost, not potential effectiveness. Ideologically zealous parties see it as desirable to ram through legislation by one vote on purely party-line votes. No wonder we have Congressional gridlock. The Founders would turn over in their graves if they saw what was going on. As a matter of fact, Jefferson, seeing the rise in populism as boatloads of poorly educated immigrants started to be exploited by politicians wrote of his concern in a letter to John Adams.

  3. Great piece, thank you.

    The “political constraints” in the energy sector extend far beyond public opinion. It is important to acknowledge the capture of regulatory bodies (e.g. state utility commissions) by fossil fuel interests. If U.S. power markets were truly responsive to pricing, as these carbon price analyses assume, there would be lot more solar power in places like Arizona. The political economy of power generation in the U.S. makes these kind of carbon price analyses extremely weak as they rely on hypothetical markets that do not exist. Carbon prices don’t necessarily reduce emissions if actors can simply pass on the cost to consumers.

    By the way, there is some excellent literature documenting how policy mandates did, in fact, secure the recent massive drop in the cost of renewable energy. This reality underscores another flaw with these carbon price analyses and affirm your point that: “It’s worth noting that these cost comparisons focus on short-run marginal abatement costs and benefits. If we think that renewable energy portfolio standards can more effectively accelerate the large scale innovation and technological change that will be required to combat climate change, then these relative dynamic efficiency advantages would offset some of the additional costs.”

    See: Evaluating the Causes of Cost Reduction in Photovoltaic Modules by Kavlak et al: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2891516

  4. Thanks Meredith for raising this issue of “second best” carbon policy, and for all the great comments. I worked for PG&E on both state and federal carbon policy when the Clean Power Plan and the CA/Quebec Cap-and-Trade programs were being developed, and with the Green New Deal I am happy to see the dialogue is being taken up again. I’ll add thoughts on pricing and technology development.

    As part of an energy procurement department, we could see that developing and scaling low carbon technologies – however it occurs – was essential to moderating low emission procurement costs. A multi-sector and ideally geographically broad carbon price seemed necessary but not sufficient for technologies that were under development. Some form of research, development and demonstration (in the field) was needed, especially given the necessary wide deployment. These are generally and even with a carbon price – “out-of-market”. Some support from somewhere, via mandates, government subsidies/incentives, even corporate R&D are needed to bring promising new technologies to scale at an acceptable and affordable cost. Equity issues arise here, based on who provides the financial support, what jobs are created and lost, and who benefits.

    I think there is a opportunity here to develop the broad themes of the Green New Deal – reducing emissions, creating new jobs, and addressing inequities. I hope many of you on this blog can lend your expertise.

  5. “These voter-on-the-street policy preferences run counter to an economist’s sensibilities.”

    And well they should Meredith, especially relating to RPS programs. A working paper written by University of Chicago economists published last week suggests they’re not cost-effective for lowering carbon emissions. Curious about your opinion of this:

    https://epic.uchicago.edu/research/publications/do-renewable-portfolio-standards-deliver

    Passing any carbon tax is unlikely before the 2020 election, but the revenue-neutral variety remains the most likely to win bipartisan support in 2021.

    • The U. of Chicago paper has two obvious problems.

      First, it’s entirely retrospective and then tries to make conclusions about future actions. The paper ignores that the high initial costs for renewables was driven down by a combination of RPS and other policies (e.g. NEM), and on a going forward basis, the renewables are now cost competitive with conventional resources. As a result, the going forward cost of GHG reductions is much smaller than the historic costs. In fact, the much more interesting question is “what would be the average cost of GHG reductions by moving from the current low penetration rate of renewables to substantially higher levels across the entire U.S., e.g., 50%, 60% etc. to 100%?” The high initial investment costs are then highly diluted by the now cost effective renewables.

      Second, the abstract makes this bizarre statement “(t)hese cost estimates significantly exceed the marginal operational costs of renewables and likely reflect costs that renewables impose on the generation system…” Um, the marginal “operational” costs of renewables generally are pretty damn close to zero! Are the authors trying to make the bizarre claim (that I’ve addressed previously) that renewables should be PRICED at their “marginal operational costs”? This seems to reflect an remarkable naivete on the part of the authors. Based on this incorrect attribution, the authors cannot make any assumptions about what might be causing the rate difference.

      Further, the authors appear to attribute the entire difference in rates to imposing an RPS standard. The fact is that these 29 states generally have also been much more active in other efforts to promote renewables, including for customers through NEM and DER rates, and to reduce demand. All of these efforts reduce load, which means that fixed costs are spread over a fewer amount of kilowatt-hours, which then causes rates to rise. The real comparison should be the differences in annual customer bills after accounting for changes in annual demand.

      The authors also try to assign stranded cost recovery as a cost of GHG recovery. This is a questionable assignment since these are sunk costs which economists typically ignore. If we are to account for lost investment due to obsolescence of an older technology, economists are going to have go back and redo a whole lot of benefit-cost analyses! The authors would have to explain the special treatment of these costs.

      • Though I often read solar and wind are “cost competitive with conventional resources,” simplistic comparisons fail to include the necessary costs of backing up intermittent generation at nighttime and on cloudy days, maintaining CCGT gas turbines in spinning reserve, and paying other regional grids to accept overgeneration when it threatens to damage local infrastructure. These costs are not insignificant. In 2017, California ratepayers were forced to pay Arizona, Nevada, and Oregon ~$1 billion to unload excess solar generation at midday. When these costs are included, the marginal cost of wind and solar are nowhere close to zero. In fact, they’re pretty damn expensive ($.0317/kWh) – 23% higher than nuclear, and 68% higher than large hydro (curiously, nuclear and large hydro are the two zero-emission sources omitted from California’s RPS through 2030):

        https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_08_04.html

        Making conclusions about future actions based on experience is warranted when no significant inputs have changed. Though wind and solar have been touted as “free energy” for half a century, integrating them into a modern AC grid has never been easy or cheap. It has nothing to do with the price of solar panels or wind turbines – they could be free. It’s physics – the nature of the beast.

        Regarding “the real comparison should be the differences in annual customer bills after accounting for changes in annual demand,” U.S. consumption of electricity has been flat for 15 years. Over the same period, electricity rates have risen 42%:

        https://tinyurl.com/yy6cbjn9

        When nuclear is being retired and replaced by renewables there is no benefit to ratepayers or the environment (arguably, there are the added costs of natural gas emissions and land use). Thus, the stranded costs of retiring and decommissioning a nuclear plant with 40+ years of useful life remaining may be justifiably assigned to its replacement.

        • Now you’re making a completely different argument than what the Chicago paper presented. Your wrote: “When these costs are included, the marginal cost of wind and solar are nowhere close to zero.” What you have described are not “marginal operational costs. (And not to say that I believe your figure of $1 billion either.) And even accepting your premise that overgeneration is costly, then the PNW and Arizona have long been exporting excess power at high “marginal costs” from their nuclear, coal and hydro plants for decades. And the excess generation from the California nuclear plants have been equally costly. The duck curve is as much the fault of Diablo Canyon as the renewables. (PG&E has already recovered all of its investment in DCPP and so the investors lose nothing by closing it.)

          I said to look at the demand in the 29 states, not the entire U.S.. How have the BILLS of those states compared to the BILLS of other states?

          Your argument about including sunk costs isn’t consistent with economic principles.

          Get off the nuclear hobby horse. I’ve already described how the industry needs to meet two objectives before we can even begin to move forward on it: https://mcubedecon.com/2019/04/26/the-two-problems-to-be-addressed-head-on-by-nuclear-power-advocates/

          • Correct, overgeneration is not a “marginal operating cost”. “The average cost of wind and solar generation is nowhere near zero.” Now – what’s the difference to the owner of a wind or solar farm?

            “The duck curve is as much the fault of Diablo Canyon as the renewables.” That’s funny, there was no duck curve before renewables. Here’s a video from the U.S. Department of Energy to help you understand:

            Ratepayers are the investors. After they’ve paid off PG&E’s capital cost recovery of $11.6 billion, PG&E abandons it, customers lose:
            “From a customer perspective, for the capital investment, the utility is effectively borrowing on behalf of the customer, and the customer will be obligated to pay that back over time.”
            https://www.copperleaf.com/articles/capital-vs-om-investments-whats-cost-customers/

            “I’ve already described how the industry needs to meet two objectives before we can even begin to move forward on it.” – yes, I’ve seen your self-reference, but no: you’ve described how nuclear needs to meet two objectives before you can move forward on it. The rest of the world is already moving forward on it.

          • Correct, overgeneration is not a “marginal operating cost”. “The average cost of wind and solar generation is nowhere near zero.” Now – what’s the difference to the owner of a wind or solar farm?

            “The duck curve is as much the fault of Diablo Canyon as the renewables.” That’s funny, there was no duck curve before renewables. Here’s a video from the U.S. Department of Energy to help you understand:

            Ratepayers are the investors in Diablo Canyon. After they’ve paid off PG&E’s capital cost recovery of $11.6 billion, PG&E abandons it, customers lose:
            “From a customer perspective, for the capital investment, the utility is effectively borrowing on behalf of the customer, and the customer will be obligated to pay that back over time.”
            https://www.copperleaf.com/articles/capital-vs-om-investments-whats-cost-customers/

            “I’ve already described how the industry needs to meet two objectives before we can even begin to move forward on it.” – yes, I’ve seen your self-reference, but no: you’ve described how nuclear needs to meet two objectives before you can move forward on it. The rest of the world is already moving forward on it.

          • I have no clue what you’re saying about overgeneration and marginal operating costs.

            On the duck curve, you’re assuming incumbency rights for Diablo Canyon that don’t really exist. You’re falling into the sunk cost fallacy. All resources are equal going forward. As I’ve pointed out the going forward costs of Diablo Canyon make it marginally uneconomic. (I’ve testified at the CPUC on this issue and PG&E has not challenged my findings.) Without 2,000 MW of baseload generation running in the spring or fall (feasible operating modes), the duck curve becomes much less of an issue.

            As pointed out here, the costs to relicense Diablo Canyon would have driven its going forward costs to more than $100/MWH by 2025. That’s not a value to ratepayers–it would have been a wealth transfer to shareholders.

            Meanwhile, the rest of the world is abandoning nuclear plants as engineering companies are going bankrupt due to skyrocketing costs. You still haven’t answered the two challenges.

          • “Marginal cost is the change in the total cost that arises when the quantity produced is incremented by one unit; that is, it is the cost of producing one more unit of a good.”
            https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marginal_cost
            In the case of a power generation plant, the unit is typically 1 MWh.

            Overgeneration occurs during midday operation, when solar plants generate more electricity than required by demand. At those times solar becomes a liability to both grid reliability, and ratepayers.

            Your “challenges” are based on a faulty assessment of the risk for nuclear energy, one with foundations in irrational fear extending back to the 1970s. And no, the rest of the world is not “abandoning nuclear plants as engineering companies are going bankrupt due to skyrocketing costs” – global nuclear capacity has been growing steadily for the last six years, as governments increasingly recognize its value as a non-intermittent, zero-carbon source of energy.
            http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/nuclear-power-in-the-world-today.aspx

          • Again, you’re trying to present a non standard definition of marginal operating costs. In the industry it is defined at the cost at the power plant to operate the plant. The report you reference clearly uses this definition because it identifies the other costs such as those related to overgeneration as a system cost that differs from the marginal operating cost.

            The bankruptcies in the Southeast U.S. and Britain belie your claim about whether the technology is cost effective. Nuclear capacity is expanding in countries where the energy prices are highly disconnected from costs for political reasons such as maintain subsidies or shifting costs to military budgets. These factors mask the true costs of the projects.

            And again, you still haven’t answered the waste disposal problem. Simply dismissing it as completely unfounded is not sufficient for a variety of reasons, including public perception which is the most critical. More nuclear certainly won’t happen if proponents have such an arrogant attitude.

          • There isn’t a waste disposal problem – spent fuel is being safely stored right now, and has been for 60 years.
            Not one death, or injury.
            I apologize if you feel I come off as arrogant, but you clearly don’t understand enough of the physics of nuclear energy and radiation to be coming to the conclusions you are. More information here: http://cgnp.org/faq/

          • Ask the former residents around Fukushima about “safe” waste storage. And the problem isn’t one measured on the scale of decades or even centuries–its millennia and longer.

  6. First, I argued for a broader role for cap & trade in the 2008 CARB AB32 Scoping Plan on behalf of EDF. And I’ve come to believe that a carbon tax is probably preferable over cap & trade when we turn to economy wide strategies for administrative reasons. (California’s CATP is burdensome and loophole ridden.) That said, one of my prime objections at the time to the Scoping Plan was the high expense of mandated measures, and that it left the most expensive tasks to be solved by “the market.”

    Fast forward to today, and we face an interesting situation because the cost of renewables and supporting technologies have plummeted. It is possible that within the next five years solar, wind and storage will be less expensive than new fossil generation. (The rest of the nation is benefiting from California initial, if mismanaged, investment.) That makes the effective carbon price negative in the electricity sector. In this situation, I view RPS mandates as correcting a market failure where short term and long term prices do not and cannot converge due to a combination of capital investment requirements and regulatory interventions. The mandates will accelerate the retirement of fossil generation that is not being retired currently due to mispricing in the market. As it is, many areas of the country are on their way to nearly 100% renewable (or GHG-free) by 2040 or earlier.

    But this and other mandates to date have not been consumer-facing. Renewables are filtered through the electric utility. Building and vehicle efficiency standards are imposed only on new products and the price changes get lost in all of the other features. Other measures are focused on industry-specific technologies and practices. The direct costs are all well hidden and consumers generally haven’t yet been asked to change their behavior or substantially change what they buy.

    But that all would seem to change if we are to take the next step of gaining the much deeper GHG reductions that are required to achieve the more ambitious goals. Consumers will be asked to get out of their gas-fueled cars and choose either EVs or other transportation alternatives. And even more importantly, the heating, cooling, water heating and cooking in the existing building stock will have to be changed out and electrified. (Even the most optimistic forecasts for biogas supplies is only 40% of current fossil gas use.) Consumers will be presented more directly with the costs for those measures. Will they prefer to be told to take specific actions, to receive subsidies in return for higher taxes, or to be given more choice in return for higher direct energy use prices?

  7. Great post, Meredith. There is some “revealed preference” by voters in Switzerland, as we have repeatedly voted on such issues. The evidence is not quite as bleak (CO2 tax on heating fuels has been accepted, which now has surpassed $100/tCO2), but with this one exception energy taxes have been rejected even if they are proposed to be fully reimbursed to the people (e.g., by lowering the VAT). In contrast, proposals for standards and subsidies tend to get approved.

    Besides the points that Meredith mentioned, one possible reason in the Swiss context is that a part of the costs associated with standards and subsidies are paid for by general income taxes (not energy users). To the extent that the median voter pays less than the average tax contribution, voting for subsidies may be fully rational from voters’ perspective.

  8. This is an excellent piece, but flinches a bit when it gets to one of the core issues: the intersection between policies technology forcing policies and eventual cost. Fowlie argues that “dynamic efficiency advantages would offset some of the additional costs” of say, an RPS (or a ZEV mandate — some comments above notwithstanding, the question of price or mandate is already cropping up in transport.)

    But the implication is that a carbon price would get us there cheaper and faster, politics aside. The evidence for that is weak. We now know — even if we don’t like — that what is required is effectively total decarbonization by mid-century. That in turn requires that as many sectors as possible be disrupted, and shifted from combustion technologies to 100% zero emission options. We have identified the core close-to-zero emission technologies for many of the key sectors: wind, solar, geothermal and nuclear in power; hydrogen and battery electrification for transport; heat pumps, induction cooking, LED’s for buildings. (We still lack them for much of industry and agriculture.)

    And most of these are past the R&D stage, and into the “cost falls as deployment accelerates” S-curve dynamic. The first generation of such technologies, however, is by far the most expensive. Gradually increasing carbon prices won’t provide enough of a cost edge to pay for the first short-range electric planes, for example, nor, given the modest role that heating costs play in overall building budgets, will it trigger the needed immediate rapid replacement of gas and oil furnaces with heat pumps, at a pace that rapidly brings down the cost of those pumps.

    A steep enough price, of course, would — but it would have to be held in place throughout the learning period. That would impose significant economic hardships on customers who would initially have no affordable alternative to combustion. It’s thus difficult to see carbon pricing as a viable strategy for rapid deployment of disruptive post-combustion technology. Once cost-reductions-by-deployment have occurred however, so that here are viable and scaled zero emission options, small price differentials can drive rapid market share shifts — the volatility of the coal/gas split in the utility sector displays how that plays out.

    Whether portfolio mandates are the most efficient policy tool to achieve cost-reductions-through-deployment is, however, unclear, even if carbon pricing is not. Perhaps we could lower the costs of innovation by having governments systematically use their purchasing power to auction off first wave purchases of zero emission technologies. But getting serious about finding the best strategies to scale post-combustion technologies will be seriously hamstrung if economists continue to behave like the classic carpenter — given a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

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